Operation Cyclone

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Cyclone Operation is the code name for the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) program to arm and finance the mujahideen in Afghanistan from 1979 to 1989, before and during military intervention by the Soviet Union to support his client, the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. The program is highly inclined towards the support of militant Islamist groups favored by the regime of Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq in neighboring Pakistan, rather than other less-ideologically insurgent Afghans who have also been battling the Marxist-oriented Democratic regime of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan since before the Soviet intervention. Cyclone's operation was one of the longest and most expensive CIA operations ever undertaken; funding began with more than $ 500,000 in 1979, rising dramatically to $ 20- $ 30 million annually in 1980 and rising to $ 630 million annually in 1987. Funding continued after 1989 when mujahedeen fought against PDPA forces Mohammad Najibullah during the civil war in Afghanistan (1989-1992).

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Communist under the leadership of Nur Muhammad Taraki seized power in Afghanistan on April 27, 1978. The new regime - shared between the extremist factions of Khalq Taraki and the more moderate Parcham - signed a friendly treaty with the Soviet Union in December of that year. Taraki's efforts to boost secular education and redistribute land accompanied by mass executions (including many conservative religious leaders) and unprecedented political repression in Afghan history, sparked insurgency by mujahidin rebels. After the general uprising in April 1979, Taraki was ousted by Khalq Hafizullah Amin's rival in September. Amen is considered a "brutal psychopath" by foreign observers; The Soviets were deeply alarmed by the brutality of Khalq's deceased regime, and suspected Amin as an agent of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), though that was not the case. In December, the Amin government has lost control over most of the country, pushing the Soviet Union to attack Afghanistan, executing Amin, and installing Parcham Babrak Karmal as president.

In the mid-1970s, Pakistani intelligence officials began lobbying privately for the US and its allies to send material aid to Islamic militants. The relationship of Pakistani President Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq to the United States has been tense during Jimmy Carter's presidency due to Pakistan's nuclear program and the execution of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in April 1979, but Carter told National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance as early as January 1979 it is important to "improve our relationship with Pakistan" given the unrest in Iran. According to former CIA official Robert Gates, "Carter's government turned to the CIA... to counter the Soviet and Cuban aggression in the Third World, especially beginning in mid-1979." In March 1979, "the CIA sent several secret action options relating to Afghanistan to the SCC [Special Coordinating Committee]" of the United States National Security Council. At a March 30 meeting, representatives of the US Department of Defense Walter B. Slocombe "asked whether there was any value in keeping the Afghan uprising," sucking the Soviet into a Vietnam swamp? '"When asked to clarify this statement, Slocombe explains:" Well, the whole idea is that if the Soviets decide to attack this tar [Afghanistan] we have an interest in ensuring that they are trapped. "But an April 5 memo from National Intelligence Officer Arnold Horelick warned:" Covert Action will increase costs for the Soviets and inflame Muslim opinion against them in many countries. The risk is that a large US secret aid program can increase bets and encourage the Soviets to intervene more directly and vigorously than intended. "In May 1979, US officials secretly began meeting rebel leaders through Pakistani government contacts.A former Pakistani military official claimed that he personally introduced a CIA official to Gulbuddin Hekmatyar that month (request of Freedom of Information Act for notes depicting these meetings has been rejected.) After additional meetings on April 6 and July 3, Carter signed the "presidential findings" "which authorizes the CIA to spend more than $ 500,000 on non-lethal aid to mujahedeen , which "seems at the beginning of a small start."

Brzezinski later claimed that "We do not encourage Russia to intervene, but we knowingly increase the likelihood that they will do it." According to Brzezinski, he became convinced in mid-1979 that the Soviets would attack Afghanistan regardless of US policy because of Carter's government's failure to respond aggressively to Soviet activity in Africa, but - regardless of the risk of unintended consequences - support for mujahidin could be an effective to prevent Soviet aggression outside of Afghanistan (especially in the original Polish Brzezinski). The full significance of the US sending aid to the Mujahideen before the invasion was debated among scholars. Some claim that directly, and even deliberately, provoke the Soviets to send troops. Bruce Riedel, however, believes that US aid is intended primarily to improve US relations with Pakistan, while Steve Coll asserts: "Contemporary memos - especially those written in the first days after the Soviet invasion - explained that while Brzezinski was determined to confront the Soviets in Afghanistan through he is also very worried that the Soviets will win... Given this evidence and the enormous political and security costs incurred by the invasion of the Carter administration, any claim that Brzezinski lured the Soviets into Afghanistan guarantees deep skepticism. "Carter itself states that pushing the Soviet invasion is "not my intention." Gates recounts: "No one in the Carter Admin wants the Soviets to invade Afghanistan and no one, as I recall, at least, ever advocated trying to persuade them to attack... Only after the Soviet invasion did some advocates who made the Soviets" bloody 'in their own Vietnam. "

Carter expressed surprise at the invasion. According to Riedel, the consensus of the US intelligence community during 1978 and 1979 - repeated until 29 September 1979 - is that "Moscow will not intervene even if it appears that the Khalq government will collapse." Indeed, Carter's diary entry from November 1979 until the Soviet invasion at the end December contains only two brief references to Afghanistan, and instead is preoccupied with the ongoing hostage crisis in Iran. In the West, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was seen as a threat to the global security and supply of Persian Gulf oil. In addition, the failure to accurately predict Soviet intentions led American officials to reassess the Soviet threats against Iran and Pakistan, although it is now known that fear is too much. For example, US intelligence closely followed the Soviet training for the invasion of Iran during the 1980s, while the earlier warning from Brzezinski that "if the Soviets dominate Afghanistan, they can promote separate Baluchistan... [thereby] divisive Pakistan and Iran" taking on a new urgency.

In the aftermath of the invasion, Carter was determined to respond vigorously. In a televised address, he announced sanctions against the Soviet Union, promised new aid to Pakistan, and promised the US to defend the Persian Gulf. Carter also called for a boycott of the 1980 Summer Olympics in Moscow, which caused bitter controversy. The British Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, enthusiastically endorsed Carter's harsh attitude, although British intelligence believes "the CIA is too concerned about the Soviet threat to Pakistan." US policy encouragement during the war was determined by Carter in the early 1980s: Carter embarked on a program to arm the mujahideen through ISI Pakistan and guarantee the promise of Saudi Arabia to match US funding for this purpose. US support for mujahedeen accelerated under Carter's successor, Ronald Reagan, with final fees for US taxpayers of about $ 3 billion. The Soviets were unable to quell the insurgency and withdraw from Afghanistan in 1989, accelerating the dissolution of the Soviet Union itself. However, the decision to send US aid through Pakistan led to massive fraud, as guns sent to Karachi were often sold in local markets rather than sent to Afghan rebels; Soon Karachi "became one of the most violent cities in the world." Pakistan also controls which rebels receive aid: Of the seven groups of Mujahideen backed by the Zia government, four embraced Islamic fundamentalist beliefs - and these fundamentalists receive the bulk of funding. Nonetheless, Carter has expressed no regrets about his decision to support what he still considers the "freedom fighter" in Afghanistan.

Although Gates describes the Director of Intelligence (DCI) Stansfield Turner and the CIA Operational Directorate (DO) as contemplating "some upgrading options" - up to and including direct weapons from the US to the mujahideen through ISI - as late as August 1979, and a Brzezinski unnamed acknowledged in a conversation with Selig S. Harrison that the US "non-lethal" aid to the Mujahideen included facilitating the delivery of weapons by a third party, Coll, Harrison, Riedel, and the head of the Near East-Southern Division at the time - Charles Cogan - all stated that no US-supplied weapons aimed at the mujahideen reached Pakistan until January 1980, after Carter changed his findings as president to include a deadly provision in Pakistan. the end of December 1979.

Maps Operation Cyclone

Program

President Reagan greatly expanded this program as part of the Reagan Doctrine to assist the anti-Soviet resistance movement overseas. To implement this policy, Reagan mobilized paramilitary officers of the CIA's Special Activities Division to equip the Mujihideen forces against the Soviet Army. Although CIA and Texas Congressman Charlie Wilson have received the greatest attention for their role, the main architect of this strategy is Michael G. Vickers, a young CIA paramilitary officer working for Gust Avrakotos, the CIA's regional head with close ties to Wilson. Vicker's strategy was to use a variety of weapons, tactics, logistics, along with training programs, to improve the capabilities of the rebels in fighting the guerrilla war against the Soviets. The Reagan program helped end the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. A senior Pentagon official, Michael Pillsbury, successfully advocated providing Stinger missiles to the Afghan resistance, according to the latest academic books and articles.

The program relies heavily on Pakistani President Mohammad Zia ul-Haq, who has close ties with Wilson. Its Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) is an intermediary for fund distribution, surrendering weapons, military training and financial support to Afghan insurgent groups. Along with funding from similar programs from MI6 and SAS UK, Saudi Arabia and the People's Republic of China, the ISI armed and trained more than 100,000 rebels between 1978 and 1992. They encouraged volunteers from Arab countries to join the Afghan resistance in its territory. fought against Afghan-based forces based in Afghanistan. All support to Sunni Mujahideen is channeled through the Pakistani government, given that the Shi'a Mujahideen have close ties with Iran at that time. Given American-Iranian tensions during that period, the US government only helps Sunni Mujahideen in Afghanistan.

Reports indicate civilian personnel from the US State Department and the CIA frequently visit the Afghan-Pakistan border area during this time, and the US is contributing heavily to helping Afghan refugees. CIA director William Casey secretly visits Pakistan several times to meet with ISI officials who run the mujahidin, and personally observe guerrilla training at least on one occasion. Coll reported it

Casey shocked Pakistani masters by proposing that they carry the Afghan war into enemy territory - into the Soviet Union itself. Casey wants to send subversive propaganda through Afghanistan to the Muslim republic in the southern republic. Pakistan agrees, and the CIA immediately provided thousands of the Qur'an, as well as books on Soviet atrocities in Uzbekistan and a treaty on Uzbek nationalist nationalist heroes, according to Pakistan and Western officials.

Other direct contact points between the US government and the mujahideen included the CIA that flew Hekmatyar to the United States, where he was hosted by State Department official Zalmay Khalizad. Hekmatyar was invited to meet President Reagan but refused, and was replaced at the October 1985 White House conference with the mujahideen by Younis Khalis, who openly invited Reagan to Islam. CIA agent Howard Hart developed a personal relationship with Abdul Haq that led to the meeting of both Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher. Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Armitage regularly meets with the Mujahideen, especially Burhanuddin Rabbani. CIA agents are also known to have provided direct cash payments to Jalaluddin Haqqani.

The stele antiaircraft built by the United States, which was channeled to the mujahideen in huge numbers starting in 1986, hit a decisive blow to Soviet war effort as it allowed the Afghans to be mildly armed to effectively defend against the Soviet helicopter landing in the area - strategic area. The Stingers were so famous and deadly that, in the 1990s, the United States undertook a "buyback" program to prevent unused missiles from falling into the hands of anti-American terrorists. The program may have been updated quietly after the US intervention in Afghanistan in late 2001, for fear that the remaining Stinger could be used against US troops in the country.

On July 20, 1987, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the country was announced based on a consultation that led to the Geneva Agreement in 1988, with the last Soviet leaving on February 15, 1989. Soviet troops succumbed to more than 14,000 lost and more than 50,000 wounded.

Funding

The US offers two packages of economic aid and military sales to support Pakistan's role in the war against Soviet forces in Afghanistan. The first six-year aid package (1981-87) amounted to US $ 3.2 billion, equally divided between economic aid and military sales. The US also sold 40 F-16s to Pakistan during 1983-87 at a cost of $ 1.2 billion outside the aid package. The second six-year aid package (1987-93) amounted to $ 4.2 billion. Of this, $ 2.28 billion is allocated for economic aid in the form of grants or loans that carry rates of 2-3 percent. The remaining allocation ($ 1.74 billion) is in the form of credit for military purchases. More than $ 20 billion of US funds are channeled into the country to train and equip Afghan insurgent groups.

Program funding increases every year for lobbying by leading US politicians and government officials, such as Charles Wilson, Gordon Humphrey, Fred Ikle, and William Casey. Under the Reagan administration, US support for the Afghan mujahidin evolved into the core of US foreign policy, called the Reagan Doctrine, in which the United States provides military and other support for anti-communist resistance movements in Afghanistan, Angola and Nicaragua.

Mujahideen benefit from the expansion of foreign military support from the United States, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and other Muslim countries. Saudi Arabia specifically agreed to match the dollar with the dollar money the CIA sent to the Mujahideen. When Saudi payment is late, Wilson and Avrakotos will fly to Saudi Arabia to persuade the monarchy to fulfill its commitments.

The level of support to various Afghan factions varies. The ISI tends to support powerful Islamists like Hekmatyar Hezb-i-Islami and Haqqani. Some Americans agree. Yet others like moderate relative like Ahmed Shah Massoud. These included two Heritage Foundation foreign policy analysts, Michael Johns and James A. Phillips, both fighting for Massoud as Afghanistan's most deserving resistance leader under the Reagan Doctrine.

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Aftermath

The US shifted its interest from Afghanistan after the withdrawal of Soviet troops. American funding Hekmatyar and his Hezb-i-Islami party were immediately cut off. The US also reduced its aid to Afghan refugees in Pakistan.

In October 1990, US President George H. W. Bush refused to declare that Pakistan had no nuclear explosive device, which triggered the imposition of sanctions against Pakistan under the Pressress Amendment (1985) in the Foreign Assistance Act. This disrupted the second aid package offered in 1987 and suspended economic aid and military sales to Pakistan with the exception of economic aid already on the way to Pakistan. Military sales and training programs are abandoned as well and several Pakistani military officers undergoing training in the US are required to return home.

At the end of 1991 Charlie Wilson persuaded the House Intelligence Committee to give the Mujahideen $ 200 million for fiscal year 1992. With matching funds from Saudi Arabia, this amounted to a contribution of $ 400 million for the year. Afghan tribes also sent US-captured weapons from Iraq in the Gulf War.

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Criticism

The US government has been criticized for allowing Pakistan to disburse Hekmatyar's disproportionate amount of funds that is controversial, which Pakistani officials believe is "their man". Hekmatyar has been criticized for killing other mujahideen and assaulting civilians, including shelling Kabul with American-supplied weapons, causing 2,000 casualties. Hekmatyar is said to be friendly with Osama bin Laden, the founder of al-Qaeda, who runs an operation to help "Afghan Arab" volunteers fight in Afghanistan, called Maktab al-Khadamat. Fearing his behavior, Pakistani leader General Zia warned Hekmatyar, "It is Pakistan that makes it a leader of Afghanistan and Pakistan that can destroy it equally if it keeps doing wrong."

The CIA and the Department of Foreign Affairs have been criticized for their direct relationship with Hekmatyar, beyond ISI contact, even though he is one of the leading heroin smugglers in the region.

In the late 1980s, Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, concerned about the growing strength of the Islamic movement, told President George H. W. Bush, "You created Frankenstein."

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Alleged CIA-assisted Connection to Bin Laden

Some suspect that bin Laden and al Qaeda are the recipients of CIA aid. This was challenged by experts such as Coll - who noted that CIA records and interviews with unclassified CIA officers did not support such claims - and Peter Bergen, who argues: "The theory that bin Laden was created by the CIA has always advanced as an axiom with no supporting evidence. "Bergen asserted that US funds were given to Afghan mujahidin, not Arab volunteers who came to help them.

But Sir Martin Ewans noted that the Afghan Arabs "benefited indirectly from CIA funding, through the ISI and resistance organizations," and that "it has been calculated that as many as 35,000" Arab-Afghans "may have received military training in Pakistan on forecasts cost $ 800 million in the years up to and including 1988. "Some of the largest CIA beneficiaries are Arab commanders such as Haqqani and Hekmatyar who are key allies of bin Laden for many years. Haqqani - one of bin Laden's closest associates in the 1980s - received direct cash payments from CIA agents, without ISI mediation. This independent source of funding gives Haqqani a disproportionate influence over the mujahidin. Haqqani and his network play an important role in al-Qaeda establishment and growth, with Jalalhuddin Haqqani allowing bin Laden to train volunteer mujahideen in the Haqqani region and build a vast infrastructure there.